


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22 May 2001

USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

# CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL

*Air University  
Air War College  
Maxwell AFB, Alabama*



*Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.*

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## Weapons of Mass Confusion

There's anthrax in the subway. Who you gonna call?

By **Joshua Green**

### **If the United States should fall victim to a chemical or biological terrorist**

**attack** like the one that killed a dozen people and injured 5,000 in Tokyo's subway six years ago, the nation would turn to men like Lt. Col. Xavier Stewart of the Army National Guard. Stewart commands an elite mobile anti-terrorism squad that specializes in unconventional weapons. He has military training in chemical, biological, and nuclear weaponry. His team is among the Guard's proudest assets, a product of the federal government's aggressive five-year effort to prepare for an unconventional terrorist attack. Which is too bad, because Stewart and his team could do little good if actually faced with such an attack. They have been mired in safety and equipment problems, plagued by defections, and hamstrung by critical design flaws--the results of a concept that looks better on paper than in practice.

Though Stewart is one of the best-trained soldiers in the U.S. military, the unit he commands--the National Guard's 3rd Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team--has not yet been certified by the Defense Department as ready for duty. Neither have any of the other 26 teams strategically stationed across the country, ostensibly ready to deploy anywhere within four hours of an attack. What's more, if the Guard's civil support teams were activated before an attack, there's a very good chance that no one would call them. Arriving as they would hours after an attack, the team's jaw-dropping skills would do little good to local emergency officials who would be on the scene in minutes. In practical terms, after three years and \$143 million, the National Guard's civil support teams are a solution in search of a problem. They're also symptomatic of a broader issue: The billions of dollars spent to prepare for an attack has only created an expensive and uncoordinated mess....  
<http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0105.green.html>

## **Leak shows nuclear trafficking doubled**

**Kirsty Scott**

**Guardian**

**Monday May 14, 2001**

The worldwide smuggling of radioactive materials has reportedly doubled in the last five years, according to a leaked United Nations study, and there are now thought to be more than 100 terrorist organisations capable of developing a rudimentary atomic bomb.

The report, drawn up by the UN's terrorism prevention branch and detailed in the Sunday Herald newspaper, reveals that since 1993 there have been 550 recorded incidents of trafficking of nuclear materials across the globe. Most of the incidents involved materials such as radioactive scrap metal but one in 10 is said to have included weapons-grade plutonium or uranium.

The study quotes the head of the UN anti-terrorism unit, Alex Schmid, as warning that much of the nuclear material in the former Soviet republics is poorly protected and the risk of some being stolen is growing.

"Time might not be on our side," Mr Schmid is reported as saying. "The amount of plutonium in the world is increasing. Vigorous efforts need to be made to keep the nuclear genie in the bottle and out of the hands of terrorists."

Mr Schmid added: "Most of the weapons-usable nuclear materials in the kilogram range are stored in nearly 400 buildings which are not all guarded in the way they should be guarded. This quantity of dangerous but potentially precious materials offers temptation for adventurers and desperados."

The 40-page report, commissioned by the international atomic energy agency, claims that there are 130 terrorist organisations listed by the US department of state as posing a potential nuclear, chemical or biological threat. They include 55 ethnic groups, 50 religious groups, 20 left-wing groups and five right-wing groups. The list includes Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaida in Afghanistan and the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan.

A UN spokeswoman said yesterday that she could not confirm or deny the existence of the report or its findings.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4185997,00.html>

**Tuesday May 15 3:17 AM ET**

## **Eco-Terrorists May Have Planted FMD Plague-Farmers**

By Michael Byrnes

CANBERRA (Reuters) - British and U.S. farm leaders claim "lunatic" eco-terrorists may be behind recent devastating outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease in Britain and Europe.

Most experts at an international farm conference in the Australian capital Canberra believe foot-and-mouth disease broke out in Britain from animal consumption of swill, possibly containing contaminated meat scraps brought in by travelers.

But some farm leaders in the International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP) also believe extreme animal rights activists may have planted Britain's foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in an effort to bankrupt intensive farming.

"I've never ruled eco-terrorism out, that's obviously something you must think of," Ben Gill, president of Britain's National Farmers Union, told Reuters.

U.S. farm leaders are also considering the possibility that bio-terrorists may try to infiltrate the disease into U.S. farmlands.

They have no proof -- no secret videos of camouflaged environmental activists lurking in bushes with suspicious spraycans, or planting contaminated food in cow troughs.

Gill pointed to a coincidence of outbreaks of foot-and-mouth in Britain's northeast and swine fever in East Anglia within six months of each other. Both diseases were Asian strains.

Gill admits unintentional spread of the disease is more likely than the work of terrorists.

#### EXTREME THREATS

But he also says intensive farming faces extreme threats. He said police had warned him several times of death threats from radical animal rights groups in Britain.

"We've got plenty of lunatic groups in Britain," he said.

"The logic would be, how can we destroy meat consumption? Discredit it in the public's eyes by creating health scares. That would make them (meat producers) unprofitable and make them go bankrupt," he said.

Dean Kleckner, immediate past president of the largest U.S. farm group, the American Farm Bureau ([news - web sites](#)) Federation, agreed that extremists could have caused the sudden outbreaks of disease.

An unofficial U.S. representative at the conference of 70 farm leaders from 26 countries, Kleckner described agri-terrorism as "a great threat." The U.S. farm sector did not send an official delegation.

"The U.S. is such a big country with unprotected borders all over, if somebody really wanted to bring in a disease like foot-and-mouth, or anything else, I think they could do it. I think it's just a matter of time before we get it in the United States," said Kleckner, now chairman of a grassroots farm organization called Truth about Trade.

The possibility of eco-terrorism was not subscribed to by Alejandro Delfino, head of Argentine farm group Sociedad Rural Argentina. South America has had plenty of its own trouble with foot-and-mouth outbreaks in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.

But Delfino said foot and mouth disease had been prevalent in Argentina for more than 50 years. It could have spread by trade from Europe or Britain, he said.

Swill feeding of garbage to animals is outlawed in the United States and Australia but not yet in Britain.

The United States has not had an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease for 72 years. Australia has been foot-and-mouth disease free since 1872.

[http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010515/wl/trade\\_farm\\_disease\\_dc\\_1.html](http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010515/wl/trade_farm_disease_dc_1.html)

## Mutant bacteria biowars threaten apocalypse now

Genetic engineers already have it within their grasp to devise a lethal bio-weapon for terrorists and rogue states, the British science publication *Nature* warns this week.

Small changes in the DNA of well-known bacteria and viruses could turn these agents into mass killers, the journal says.

The publication echoes warnings by a pair of Australian scientists, Dr Ron Jackson and Dr Ian Ramshaw, who accidentally created an astonishingly virulent strain of mousepox, a cousin of smallpox, among laboratory mice. They realised that if similar genetic manipulation was carried out on smallpox, an unstoppable killer could be unleashed. They decided to publish their findings in January to draw attention to the potential misuse of biotechnology.

*Nature* warns: "Making subtle genetic alterations to existing pathogens to increase their virulence or durability in the environment, or to make them harder to detect or to treat with drugs, is within the limits of today's technology.

"With the decoding of a pathogen's entire genome now commonplace, and transgenic techniques advancing all the time, some researchers believe that the sinister potential of biology can no longer be ignored."

Biowarfare - use of germs or viruses such as anthrax or smallpox - has long been considered by military strategists. However, the risk has increased thanks to advances in knowledge about how genes work, new techniques for moving pieces of DNA around, and the relative ease with which a rogue organisation could build or hire a lab to build such a weapon.

Scientists interviewed by *Nature* ruled out, for the time being, the ability to build new, artificial agents from a set of component parts.

A far simpler way would be to tweak the performance of an existing bacteria to make it more resistant to antibiotics, they said.

The genetic sequences of bacteria such as tuberculosis, cholera, leprosy and the plague are already in the public domain - as is that of a food poisoning bug, *Staphylococcus aureus*, that is already becoming resistant to antibiotics. By identifying the genes from *Staphylococcus aureus* that make the bug resistant, and inserting them into the other bacteria, a scientist could make a killer for which there would be scant defence.

Dr Willem Stemmer, chief scientist with Maxygen, a California pharmaceutical research firm, used one of these techniques to explore how resistance genes work, *Nature* reports.

He created a strain of the common intestinal bug *Escherichia coli* that was 32,000 times more resistant to the antibiotic cefotaxime than conventional strains. He destroyed the superbug in response to the American Society for Microbiology's concerns about potential misuse.

"It's time for biologists to begin asking what means we have to keep the technology from being used in subverted ways," said Harvard University molecular biologist Professor Matthew Meselson, who has often spoken of the dangers of biowarfare. **Agence France-Presse**

<http://www.smh.com.au/news/0105/17/world/world3.html>

Wednesday, 16 May, 2001, 23:51 GMT 00:51 UK

## **Biological weapons could be even deadlier**

Experts say biotechnology could be used to make more effective weapons

By BBC Science's Corinne Podger

Diseases such as anthrax and botulism have long been feared for their potential use as bio-weapons.

But researchers in the journal *Nature* say the pathogens responsible for these illnesses could be made even more deadly using the latest techniques in biotechnology.

Earlier this year, scientists in Australia were working on a genetically based contraceptive to control the country's mouse plague.

But, in the process, they accidentally created an unusually deadly strain of mousepox, which is related to the human smallpox virus.

Lethal disease

In their journal paper, the researchers noted that if a similar genetic manipulation was done on smallpox virus, this lethal disease could be made even more dangerous.

The genetic experts warn that many other lethal pathogens could also be modified for use as devastating biological weapons.

Anthrax, for example, is already one of the world's most deadly diseases, but it can be treated using antibiotics.

Alistair Hay, a biological warfare expert at Leeds University, UK, says that the anthrax bacterium could be altered to resist antibiotics.

Genetic information

And work of this kind could be made easier as the genetic codes of more and more lethal bacteria and viruses are completed and published.

The genetic sequences of pathogens behind tuberculosis and cholera have already been published, and those responsible for anthrax and leprosy will be completed later this year.

But, Tim Read, one of the researchers sequencing anthrax, said there were benefits as well as risks in making genetic information about these disease-causing microbes public.

While access to genetic data might make it easier to produce more deadly versions of killer diseases, Dr Read said it was also stimulating vigorous research into new vaccines and drugs to treat them.

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid\\_1334000/1334986.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_1334000/1334986.stm)

## **Chemical Weapon Excavation Over At Old Defense Depot**

By Tom Charlier

Although it proved much more costly and time-consuming than anticipated, the excavation of chemical-warfare munitions from a site at the old Defense Depot Memphis has been completed, officials said Thursday.

Working under a sealed tent to contain vapors, federal contractors recovered bomb casings, tainted soil and other material left from the 1946 disposal of World War II German mustard munitions and American chemical-warfare identification kits in a field on the northwest corner of the installation in South Memphis.

The project, conducted amid a longer-term environmental cleanup at Dunn Field, was intended to help make the depot property suitable for re-use in the future. The 642-acre base was closed in 1997.

Clyde Hunt, remedial program manager at the depot, said there were no releases to the environment during the excavation.

Last September three workers became ill during the excavation. But Hunt said there was no evidence the illnesses were caused by chemical agents, adding that intense heat might have been a factor.

The project cost \$10 million, nearly double the \$5.5 million that had been projected.

Hunt attributed the higher costs to the unexpectedly long period of time required for the excavation. Because of problems associated with the heat and the installation of the vapor-containment structure, the work lasted about 12 months instead of three, he said.

The German mustard munitions had been shipped to the United States in bomb casings and placed on trains bound for Pine Bluff, Ark.

The bombs were unloaded in Memphis after containers in three cars were found to be leaking. At the disposal site, the mustard was drained into pits, neutralized and burned and the casings buried separately.

The material excavated from the three sites at the depot disposal field included:

- All 29 of the bomb casings reported buried at the site.
- A box of 24 empty bottles that were part of chemical agent identification kits.
- More than 100,000 vials containing sodium hydroxide pills, which were used to detect chemical vapors.
- Soil containing low levels of mustard, which was removed from the neutralization pit and sent to disposal sites out of state.

Officials now will develop a further cleanup plan to deal with other wastes buried in Dunn Field.

Reginald Eskridge, a community representative who attended the completion announcement Thursday, said officials did an "excellent job" with the chemical munitions removal.

"Our community is concerned about what happens next," Eskridge said.

## **U.S. National Missile Defense Final Curtain Call For Global Nuclear Standoff**

Summary -- Despite dire warnings, the deployment of a U.S. National Missile Defense system will not ignite a new international arms race reminiscent of the Cold War. The old order of nuclear deterrence is ending and U.S. missile defense plans will help put it to rest for good. Its replacement is already evident in an emerging new order of conventional military gamesmanship.

Analysis -- From Europe to Asia, senior U.S. State Department officials have been lobbying their counterparts in a handful of countries to support, or at least accept, the American argument that the proliferation of ballistic missiles requires Washington to construct a multilayered National Missile Defense system, based on land, on sea, in the air and possibly in space.

American diplomats, dispatched by U.S. President George W. Bush, have made headway among European allies and Canada and even with Russia and China, the most forceful opponents of NMD. The international community

may not support the system, but it appears resigned to the fact that NMD, if financial and developmental hurdles are overcome, will be constructed later this decade.

Still, many leaders in the international community maintain that the NMD deployment – which would require the renegotiation or American withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty – will upend Cold War non-proliferation efforts and lead to another nuclear arms race.

But such concerns are unfounded. The Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) has dissipated considerably as both the United States and Russia seek to dramatically reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and address more conventional 21st century threats. As a result, an arms race defined by the old rules will not materialize, and NMD will have little or no effect on the nuclear competition or the proliferation of long-range missiles around the world. Instead, countries will continue, and possibly accelerate, current efforts to retool their conventional weapons and forces for future battles.

The Bush proposal for a missile shield is contingent on a renegotiation or American withdrawal from the ABM treaty with Russia, which outlawed national missile defenses as a way to limit the possibility either side would consider using the nuclear option in conflict because each would be vulnerable to a devastating retaliatory strike. While Russia remains opposed to changing the treaty, there have been indications that Moscow would not view a limited missile defense system as a significant threat to its nuclear deterrent. These activities – such as giving greater priority to conventional forces rather than nuclear weapons – combine with a more cooperative relationship with the United States to make it unlikely Russia will attempt to build up its strategic nuclear forces. They will not fall into the trap of trying, futilely, to keep up with the United States as the Soviet Union attempted in the waning days of the Cold War.

Moreover, Russia no longer sees the West and a nuclear conflict as its primary national security threat. Rather, it is focusing on internal challenges such as those presented in the Chechen wars of the 1990s and is seeking to increase Russian military capabilities accordingly.

For example, in calling for the re-establishment of an independent military space force – a move intended to resurrect Russian military space capabilities – Russian President Vladimir Putin will effectively undercut the Strategic Rocket Forces (RSVN). The RSVN has been responsible for the military space mission since 1997 and cash generated from commercial satellite launches will no longer go into the RSVN's coffers.

Russia has been leading the debate with the United States over the future of nuclear arms control, taking the initiative in seeking to reach a START III agreement that would dramatically reduce both sides' nuclear arsenals to below 1,500 warheads. Russia cannot afford to maintain its current arsenal and considers modernizing its conventional forces more important. Washington recently expressed its desire to make drastic nuclear weapons cuts. Both the United States and Russia have begun to consider the utility of tactical nuclear weapons, suggesting that neither country believes the use of low-yield battlefield nukes would trigger even an accidental strategic nuclear engagement.

But Russia will not stand idle if the Pentagon's NMD system moves forward. Moscow is likely to make improvements to its two primary nuclear options – land-based missiles and submarine-launched missiles. It is also likely to develop countermeasures to overcome the NMD system – just in case it evolves into more than a limited defensive shield – including developing dummy warheads, stealth warheads and possibly, with U.S. agreement, returning to multiple-warhead missiles.

China, for all its anti-NMD rhetoric, is unlikely to view the U.S. missile shield as a threat to its nuclear deterrent. China never subscribed to the MAD doctrine; its 20 or so nuclear-equipped intercontinental ballistic missiles, ICBMs, could never compete with the thousands of weapons in U.S. and Russian inventories. It even remains unclear whether Chinese ICBMs could even reach more than just the western United States. Its nuclear deterrent is a regional one, not a global one, aimed primarily at deterring nuclear-capable India while forcing other regional actors to think twice before challenging its security interests.

But China is concerned about missile defense technologies proliferating in the form of theater missile defense systems that provide a defense for regional competitors like Taiwan and Japan; NMD and TMD technologies are effectively one in the same.

China also worries about India acquiring this technology, although this is a much less likely scenario because it could recreate MAD on a smaller scale. Overall China will not be inclined to increase its nuclear arsenal significantly if the United States deploys NMD.

Current efforts in China to improve the effectiveness of its nuclear arsenal and develop a nuclear ballistic missile submarine – activities that have been underway for many years – will continue. China will also continue to build up its conventional missile force, particularly across from Taiwan, to ensure it can neutralize any TMD system that may be provided to Taipei. Meanwhile, China is likely to accelerate efforts to find new ways to sidestep American

military strengths, further honing its computer warfare skills and technologies as well other strategic capabilities such as submarines that can deny Washington some its military options.

Countries such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq – cited as posing the greatest risk of missile attack – will likewise refrain from building up their strategic missile forces. They lack the technical expertise and the resources. They will continue to improve their missile capabilities as they have in the last decade, but will increasingly turn their attention to asymmetric military capabilities – particularly low-tech ones that aim to make an end-run around American and other nation's defenses.

U.S. NMD plans are unlikely to throw the international arms control regime out of kilter as many critics suggest. The geo-strategic landscape has changed such that that nuclear deterrence, while still important, is no longer the pre-eminent concern of the United States and Russia. To China, the Cold War doctrine never really applied. As long as New Delhi does not erect missile defenses, China will not dramatically change its military modernization focus because of NMD.

In the end, a U.S. missile shield will serve as the final curtain call for the global nuclear standoff and arms race that began with the Cold War, setting the stage for new, more conventional competition.

Birmingham (AL) News  
May 19, 2001

## **Shelby Says Incinerator Needs Overhaul**

By Mary Orndorff, News Washington correspondent

WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Ala., Friday joined the growing chorus of elected officials criticizing the chemical weapons incineration program and the safety precautions planned for the people of Anniston.

"The lack of accountability within this program has led to counterproductive finger-pointing and dangerous inefficiency," Shelby wrote Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on Friday. It has "left communities scrambling to prepare for destruction and worried because of the cloud of distrust that continues to surround this program." Shelby, a member of a key Senate appropriations committee, told Rumsfeld the Senate would "demand an honest accounting and act swiftly to address obvious and serious organizational problems."

The third-term senator from Tuscaloosa called a hearing last month where Anniston residents, incinerator opponents and top Army officials gave radically different opinions on scheduling and safety. The \$1 billion incinerator at the Anniston Army Depot is scheduled to start burning 2,250 tons of nerve agents in 2002 and finish by 2006, but an internal Army memo corroborated by the Congressional Research Service said the process could take until 2014. A spokeswoman for the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization has said that the memo was a worst-case scenario and that while it may take until later than 2006 to rid Anniston of its stockpile, it most likely would not take until 2014.

Residents also fear that an emergency response plan that calls for some people to evacuate and others to stay indoors is inadequate.

Shelby said he still supports using incineration to destroy chemical weapons. But, he wrote, "I will insist that the Army fully meet its statutory duty to provide maximum protection to every Alabamian who could be affected by this operation."

Rumsfeld's in-box is getting a lot of traffic on this topic.

Monday, Sen. Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., complained to Rumsfeld about gross mismanagement and "an embarrassing trend of deception" over how long it will take to destroy the nation's stockpile, how long it will take to clean up afterward, and how much it will all cost.

Tuesday, Gov. Don Siegelman wrote to President Bush complaining that an earlier letter to Rumsfeld was not answered. The governor warned he would try to stop the incinerator from firing up if safety issues aren't settled. The latest cost estimate for the total chemical demilitarization program is more than \$14 billion.

Craig Williams, director of a chemical weapons watchdog organization based in Kentucky, said Shelby's letter should encourage the Department of Defense to restructure the program and rework its chain of command.

"There is an increasing amount of attention and support for a fundamental change in the way this program is executed and I welcome that 1,000 percent," said Williams, who opposes incineration.

For local leaders in Anniston and Calhoun County, the issue also involves money. They are asking for \$70 million to compensate for having the incinerator in their community, and Williams said the growing stack of complaints from Congress make the payment more likely.

Washington Times

May 21, 2001

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## **U.S. Wavers On Demand For Iraq Inspections**

By Joyce Howard Price, The Washington Times

Vice President Richard B. Cheney says it is uncertain whether the easing of U.N. sanctions on Iraq would require the return of U.N. weapons inspectors to check if Saddam Hussein is developing weapons of mass destruction. When asked yesterday on NBC's "Meet the Press" about possible changes to the sanctions regime on Iraq being considered in the U.N. Security Council next week, Mr. Cheney said the United States "would continue to demand inspections" but suggested it could accept their loss -- a sweeping reversal of previous U.S. policy.

In the past, this country has always set a return of U.N. weapons inspectors -- who were removed from Iraq in late 1998 in anticipation of U.S. bombing raids -- as a condition for easing the sanctions imposed on Iraq a decade ago as punishment for invading Kuwait and starting the Persian Gulf war.

Before the inspectors were withdrawn, Saddam said he would no longer cooperate with them. After they left, a state-run Iraqi newspaper said Baghdad would tolerate crippling sanctions rather than accept the inspectors' return.

Asked on NBC if sanction relief would be ruled out unless the U.N. weapons inspectors are allowed back into Iraq, Mr. Cheney said, "I can't say that."

The reason for the uncertainty, he said, is that negotiations "with members of the Security Council and our allies and friends in the world" on the sanctions that would be appropriate are still under way.

Mr. Cheney was then asked if the United States would view it as a "defeat" if Iraq is no longer subject to U.N. weapons inspections. He replied: "The key here is what happens with respect to Saddam's military capability, and the argument is and has been by many of our friends in the region that the way the sanctions are operating now, they are, in fact, damaging relationships, in part because of harm that is done to civilians."

Mr. Cheney said Saddam uses that claim "as an excuse, frankly," for fostering anti-American sentiment in the region and justifying his repressive rule. He added that the United States now thinks "focusing on the military aspects . . . and retargeting the sanctions on the important [weapons] technologies and capabilities is crucial here."

In the NBC interview, the vice president was not asked how anyone can determine exactly what "important technologies and capabilities" Iraq has or is developing, without reports from impartial weapons inspectors.

According to published reports, the sanction-relief plan jointly proposed by the United States and Britain would end bans on civilian goods imported to Iraq but tighten controls on military-related supplies. The original plan reportedly required the return of the weapons inspectors as a condition for providing more focused sanctions.

But Mr. Cheney said yesterday: "Exactly what's going to come out of the consultations that are now under way, I wouldn't want to predict."

This is not the first time Mr. Cheney has suggested weapons inspectors may be dispensable.

In an interview March 2 with editors and reporters of The Washington Times, Mr. Cheney said inspectors "may not be as crucial" as in the past, "if you've got" a sanctions program in place that "people are willing to support."

But just hours after the interview, Lewis "Scooter" Libby, the vice president's chief of staff, called The Times to clarify Mr. Cheney's remarks. Mr. Libby said he wanted to make it clear that Mr. Cheney did not think the inspectors had become unimportant. "We expect the Iraqis to live up to all the U.N. resolutions, including getting the inspectors back," the aide said.

The vice president did not offer details about what he described as the "refocused sanctions" being proposed by Secretary of State Colin Powell. But he said they include "very tough" measures with respect "to anything that relates to the military" that would "keep the revenue from oil sales flowing through the U.N. escrow account, which is really key to maintaining those sanctions."

On "Meet the Press," Mr. Cheney was also asked about the disabled Navy surveillance plane that has been sitting on the ground in China for seven weeks, after being struck and damaged by a Chinese fighter jet on April 1.



China has said the United States can have its \$80 million plane back, but it doesn't want the aircraft to be flown off Hainan island. Beijing has refused the United States permission to fly the EP-3E plane, even though an American assessment team concluded it is flyable.

Asked if the Bush administration will demand that the plane be flown out of China, Mr. Cheney said, "My guess is that it may well have to be crated out, partly because it's in such bad shape. Whether or not we should actually leave it there and try to repair it and then fly it out or crate it out, that's a subject to be negotiated with the Chinese."

New York Times

May 20, 2001

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## **U.S. Germ Warfare Review Faults Plan On Enforcement**

By Michael R. Gordon and Judith Miller

A confidential Bush administration review has recommended that the United States not accept a draft agreement to enforce the treaty banning germ weapons, according to American officials.

The recommendations appear certain to distress allies, who back the draft accord and are concerned that the new administration is concentrating too much on new military programs and not enough on treaties and nonproliferation. After six years of negotiations, diplomats in Geneva have produced the draft agreement, known as a protocol, which would establish measures to monitor the ban on biological weapons.

A 1972 treaty, which 143 nations have ratified, prohibits the development, production and possession of biological weapons. But the treaty has always lacked a means of verifying compliance. United States support for the protocol is critical to the effort to give the treaty teeth.

The Clinton administration cast the new protocol as an important tool to stem the spread of biological weapons. And international negotiators in Geneva have been rushing to complete it by November.

But the new Bush administration has taken a far more skeptical approach. In a unanimous review, its interagency team concluded that the current version of the protocol would be inefficient in stopping cheating, and that all its deficiencies could not be remedied by the negotiating deadline.

"The review says that the protocol would not be of much value in catching potential proliferators," a senior American official said.

The White House has yet to formally endorse the review's conclusions, but since all the relevant agencies agreed to it, the White House is considered virtually certain to go along. The real issue is what steps to adopt in light of the recommendations, and how to proceed diplomatically. Although the review strongly objects to the current version of the protocol, it does not rule out fresh attempts to address monitoring.

And the review is also emerging as a sensitive diplomatic problem. President Bush heads to Europe next month, and his administration has already been under fire for steering too unilateralist a course on foreign policy, by backing away from the Kyoto accords on global warming and, to a lesser extent, the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty. So the White House is eager to avoid a new split.

Tibor Toth, the Hungarian diplomat who has overseen the effort to negotiate the protocol, will fly to Washington this week to try to change the Bush administration's mind, American officials said.

"Different constituencies seem to see different flaws, which indicates it is a pretty good compromise," Mr. Toth said in a telephone interview. "If it still needs to be fixed, we have the time. Barriers have been raised to nuclear and chemical proliferation. If the world community fails to agree on a protocol to strengthen the ban on biological weapons after six years of talks, it will send a very unfortunate message."

The first step to ban germ weapons was taken when President Richard M. Nixon and other world leaders signed the treaty in 1972, at the dawn of arms control. But the agreement had no means of enforcing compliance. That became an enormous concern after President Boris N. Yeltsin conceded in 1992 that the Soviet Union had violated the accord by maintaining a long-standing biological-weapons program after the treaty went into force. Then evidence was acquired after the Persian Gulf war confirming that Iraq also had germ weapons, heightening fears over biological warfare. Most of the dozen or so countries that are believed to have biological weapons programs -- like Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea -- are members of the 1972 treaty.

So a decade ago, during the administration of Mr. Bush's father, the United States and other nations began studying what could be done to monitor the treaty. Six years ago, they began talks on a new protocol.

There have been many obstacles. China, which has little experience with formal arms-control treaties, is reluctant to allow on-site inspections. Pakistan is concerned that inspectors searching for germ weapons might investigate its nuclear weapons sites. And in the negotiations Iran has been trying to weaken controls on the export of biological equipment and materials, saying they hurt its civilian economies.

The United States, for its part, has had conflicting motivations. On one hand, it has worked to limit the scope of visits by foreign inspectors in order to protect American pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, which dominate the worldwide industry and are concerned with protecting their trade secrets.

And at the behest of the Pentagon, the government tried to limit inspections of American biodefense installations, which develop vaccines and protective equipment and analyze the germ warfare threat.

As a result, the United States has not been as tough on verification as most of its allies. And yet Washington also hoped that the protocol would discourage cheating.

Under the 210-page protocol, parties agree to make known their vaccine production facilities, the largest biodefense installations and facilities that do genetic engineering or aerosol studies with germ agents that are most likely to be used in weapons. But it would not require a declaration of all types of facilities that could be used to make weapons, including food and beverage plants and some pharmaceutical plants.

As for inspections, a new executive council would be established and a majority vote of the body would be required before an investigation of a suspicious plant could be carried out. That procedure, insisted on by American industry, is less strict than a similar provision in the treaty banning chemical weapons, which stipulates that such investigations are to be done unless there is a vote by three-fourths of a similar body to block them. Inspectors under the biological protocol would have to be granted access 108 hours after an inspection was approved.

Defenders say the goal of the protocol was never to provide air-tight verification but rather to increase the chances that cheaters would be caught and thereby deter violations. Some monitoring and openness, they say, is better than none.

But critics of the protocol say the accord would not really provide much security. A nation that was determined to cheat could find a way to do so and might use the limited inspections to throw other nations off the trail, they say. In this view, the United States would open itself up to inspections and get little in return.

When the Bush administration took office, the issue came to the fore. Donald A. Mahley, the American negotiator at the talks, proposed a review. The interagency group he led included working-level officials from the State Department, the Pentagon, the Commerce Department, the Energy Department and intelligence agencies.

The review found 38 problems with the protocol, a handful of them serious. But its basic assessment was very critical. It concluded that the verification measures in the treaty were unlikely to detect cheating. At the same time, the review concluded that these same provisions might be used by foreign governments to try to steal American secrets.

The review recommended that the United States not support the draft protocol that Ambassador Toth had overseen. And it concluded that there was not enough time to fix all the problems before the negotiating deadline.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell has approved the review, which has been circulating in the administration.

Officially, however, the White House insists that the review has not been completed, in part because it has yet to figure out a new policy.

But as word of the review has begun to seep out, it is already prompting debate. Barbara H. Rosenberg, a specialist at the Federation of American Scientists, said the Bush administration should have worked to improve the accord during the last negotiating round if it did not like it. Instead, the United States was passive, with the new administration claiming that it could not act while the policy review was supposedly under way.

"The U.S. sat quietly throughout the sessions and said nothing," Dr. Rosenberg said. "It made no effort to improve the text."

But Michael L. Moodie, a senior arms control official in the first Bush administration, said the protocol was severely flawed and needed to be replaced by a new approach.

"The protocol was not going to get the job done," Mr. Moodie said. "It is not going to deter proliferation." And if it was put into effect, he said, "we still would not be confident that there were not major violations going on."

If the White House, as expected, affirms the review, it has several alternatives. One is to try to improve the accord before the November deadline but to accept the fact that the United States is unlikely to obtain all the changes it would like. But there is little or no support for that approach in the administration.

Another is to ask that the deadline be extended so that negotiators would work on a substantially different protocol.

Or the United States could take a significantly different approach. Supporters of that idea, which is being actively discussed in the administration, say Washington should propose a stripped-down version of the protocol that would provide for investigations when violations of the convention are suspected. Such inspections, for example, might be

carried out if there was a suspicious outbreak of disease, as happened in Sverdlovsk, Russia, in 1979 when anthrax spores escaped from a biological weapons plant.

There is a recognition within the administration that breaking off talks on biological-weapons monitoring altogether is not feasible because of diplomatic costs. That is especially the case because the administration is already involved in sensitive talks with its allies on the missile defense issue and has been eager to show that it is not ideologically opposed to arms control.

Still, the turnabout in American policy is likely to provoke concern from American allies, particularly the British, who have been very active on the treaty.

When Prime Minister Tony Blair visited Washington in February, he insisted that the United States promise to pursue nonproliferation measures and not just missile defense, and the Bush administration agreed to mention nonproliferation in the statement that both leaders issued.

### **A Biological Warfare Sampler**

Biological weapons like those listed below are banned under the germ weapons treaty.

Anthrax, a bacteria, causes fever, fatigue, cough and other discomforts followed by severe respiratory distress. Shock and death can occur within 24 to 36 hours.

Tularemia, a bacteria, can result in fever, headache, weight loss, pneumonia and other symptoms, occasionally leading to death.

Smallpox, a virus, causes fever, vomiting, headaches, and in some cases delirium. Patients should be quarantined.

Botulinum, a toxin, results in general weakness, dizziness, blurred vision, and leads to paralysis and respiratory failure.

*(Source: U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases)*

Stars and Stripes Omnimedia  
May 21, 2001

## **Air Force Balks At Buck Resignation; Anthrax Trial Continues**

By Dave Eberhart, Stars and Stripes News Editor

*(Stars and Stripes Omnimedia is a privately owned news source and is in no way affiliated with the U.S. government.)*

Air Force doctor Capt. John Buck, on trial at Keesler Air Force Base, Miss., for refusing an order to take the military's mandatory anthrax shots, faces denial of a request to resign from the service he made last week after losing a bid to have the order declared unlawful.

Lt. Col. Mark Allred, the military judge, May 18 agreed to a defense request for a continuance in the trial until today, when a jury of military officers is to hear evidence on a single count of failure to obey a lawful order.

Chris Antoon of Pascagoula, Miss., faxed a petition to Sen. Trent Lott, R-Miss., May 18 bearing the signatures of some 100 citizens opposed to Buck's court-martial.

"It was easy," said Antoon. "I went into an insurance company and a bank to ask one friend at each business to sign the petition, and everybody wanted to sign."

The petition asks that Lott request Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld or the acting Air Force secretary to allow Buck to resign.

"Dr. Buck stood on principle," Lott said last week.

Frank Spinner, Buck's attorney, said, "We are gratified by the outpouring of support from local citizens, and we hope that Air Force leaders choose to do what is in both the best interests of the Air Force and Capt. Buck and allow him to resign."

During four days of pre-trial hearing last week, Spinner introduced Pentagon documents generated during a 1999 congressional probe of the anthrax vaccination program which indicated that military officials were struggling to frame answers to questions about the legality of the vaccine.

### **Medical Histories**

Buck told The Stars and Stripes in his practice at Keesler AFB, he has seen case after case of harm done by the controversial vaccine. The medical history is always the same, he says: A patient showing no symptoms before the

shot series would experience serious symptoms afterward, including chronic fatigue, thyroid disorders and faulty autoimmune functioning.

"Not long before I was ordered to commence the series, a fellow officer and friend told me gratuitously: 'Whatever you do, don't take that vaccine,'" Buck said. His friend, after completing the series, "went from the top 10 percent of the physically fit to someone who could barely get out of bed in the morning," Buck said.

But why risk a criminal conviction?

"I'm doing this for the men and women in the service," Buck said. "I had no interest in getting embroiled in this. Typically, those who were refusing the vaccine were being punished...and were receiving forfeiture of half their base pay each month--through to the end of their tours."

Wall Street Journal

May 21, 2001

## We Can Topple Saddam

By Ahmad Chalabi

Iraq is a country of fear. The people live in fear of the regime and the rulers fear the will of the people. Recognizing this, in 1998 the U.S. Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act with overwhelming bipartisan support, making it U.S. policy to provide help to those Iraqis committed to overthrowing the totalitarian dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and establishing democracy in our country.

After decades of struggle and suffering, we Iraqis finally have a chance to get on the right side of history. We are willing to make any sacrifice to achieve this and we call upon the policy makers in Washington to implement the law of the United States. This is our manifesto, in so many words.

Unfortunately, some U.S. policymakers are hesitant to provide us with the legislated support. And now there is talk in Washington of weakening U.N. sanctions on Iraq and abandoning the no-fly zones the U.S. has enforced for a decade to protect Iraqis in the north and south of the country from Saddam's aggression.

### **There's No 'Box'**

Critics of the idea of overthrowing the Iraqi regime have long argued that a vaguely defined policy of "containment," whereby the dictator is said to be kept "in his box," is better than a regime change. But within that "box" Saddam has remained free to oppress the Iraqi people and develop his weapons of mass destruction. Today he is unrepentant and flush with new oil money. Seeing the gradual meltdown of the international resolve to keep his regime isolated and unimpeded by arms inspectors, he is focused on restoring his glory and pursuing his megalomaniacal dreams of conquest.

Every day he makes new threats against the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. He uses every chance to stoke the fires of conflict in the Middle East, trying to meddle in Israeli-Arab affairs and establish a link between the peace process and sanctions. There will be no peace between Israelis and Arabs while Saddam is in power. He has demonstrated that he is capable of unprovoked aggression and the serial use of weapons of mass destruction. Given the chance, he will do so again.

The Iraqi National Congress represents the broad spectrum of Iraqi political parties and groups. All elements of the Iraqi opposition are united behind the INC's twin goals -- the overthrow of the dictatorship and the establishment of a constitutional government in Iraq committed to democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

The INC has already proven it is up to the task. Following the Gulf War, we established military bases in northern Iraq and organized an effective force of some 7,000 fighters. Even the idea of an organized resistance was a challenge to the fragile regime, already in disarray, but our efforts went much further than that. As we strengthened our operational base inside Iraq, the INC became an umbrella organization for all the diverse resistance groups. (Some of our critics view this multifaceted nature of the Iraqi opposition as its weakness; we see INC's democratic and diverse nature as its core strength.)

Simultaneous with its military activities, the INC developed strong links to the inner circle of the Iraqi establishment, forming clandestine ties with members of Saddam's military apparatus and prominent leaders in Iraqi society. The payoff was invaluable. Apart from gaining direct access to information about the regime, the INC became a magnet for regime insiders who yearned to be rid of Saddam. Iraq's director of military intelligence, Gen. Wafiq Samarra, and chief nuclear scientist, Khidar Hamza, were two of the many high-level defectors who came to the INC during that period.

We effectively broke Saddam's stranglehold over information by making the first uncensored television and radio broadcasts in Iraq. In March 1995 we successfully mounted a military challenge against the Iraqi army, taking out two divisions. We were well on our way to removing Saddam.

Responding to the threat, Saddam attacked us and things took a different turn in September 1996 when the U.S., contrary to its commitment to the INC, failed to provide air cover against Saddam's aggression. Our operations were devastated as 40,000 troops and 400 tanks swept the region -- something people who now want to relax the no-fly zones should consider.

As the Bush administration moves forward to develop its policy toward Iraq, our message is clear: Toppling the dictator is a viable, practical option, not a suffering people's distant dream. Saddam today is vulnerable. Life in Iraq is a saga of daily acts of resistance, large or small, armed or passive. In Iraqi Kurdistan in the north, Saddam's authority is weak, extending only to intelligence operatives and paid agents. Southern Iraq is in a state of latent revolution, punctuated by increasing armed rebellion against the regime. Even in Baghdad and central Iraq, Saddam is continuously challenged, and his security forces are only able to suppress, not pre-empt, frequent and large-scale uprisings against his authority.

The INC can be the leading element in overthrowing the regime, and establishing a popular, democratically elected government in Iraq. Pessimists can argue that this is a hopeless cause. But, then again, in 1980 few thought that a ragtag bunch of Afghan rebels would be able to take on the mighty Soviet 40th Field Army.

Since late last year, when the Clinton administration finally released funds to the INC, we have succeeded in making significant strides. We have again united the opposition, established our administrative base, and opened offices in countries bordering Iraq. We have initiated a radio and television campaign in Iraq and will soon begin distributing humanitarian aid to areas where Saddam denies any assistance.

We are embarking on a number of initiatives inside the country and the response from the Iraqi people is overwhelming. We also hold ourselves up to the Iraqi people as the only example of a genuinely Iraqi institution based on the principles of democracy, pluralism and tolerance. Our leadership is elected and our membership encompasses all elements of Iraqi society: Sunnis, Shia, Kurds and others.

#### **Clear Choice**

Toppling the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein will not be an easy task. But with renewed commitment to our cause from the Bush administration, many Iraqis believe the light at the end of the tunnel is closer than ever. And as in all totalitarian societies, the more people who believe that the dictator is vulnerable, the more precarious his position becomes.

The U.S. faces a clear choice. Sanctions, bombing and containment have not proven to be sustainable. Either Saddam must go, and go quickly, or he must be accommodated. If he is accommodated, he will develop weapons of mass destruction and there is no doubt that he will use those weapons. If he is removed, Iraq can become the peaceful and prosperous country that its people, the region and the world deserve.

*Ahmad Chalabi is president of the Iraqi National Congress.*

Aviation Week & Space Technology

May 21, 2001

## **Nuclear Weapons Showing Age**

By Robert Wall, Washington

As the Bush Administration completes its nuclear posture review, the aging of those weapons and hurdles to keeping them operationally viable are emerging as key issues that will need to be addressed.

The scope of the problems has been highlighted by a group of experts conducting a congressionally mandated, three-year assessment of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Furthermore, holes in the nuclear weapons stewardship program were also brought out in congressional testimony by John A. Gordon, the head of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

In the second of its three annual reports, the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile has found that there continue to be shortages in the Energy and Defense Departments' nuclear weapons management efforts, although improvements have been made. Among the problems are the aging stockpile and nonexistent retrofit capabilities, low morale and recruitment difficulties, and lack of a plan to reestablish critical production capabilities.

THE AVERAGE AGE of the nuclear weapons arsenal is about 18 years, compared with an intended design life of 12 years when the systems were fielded, John S. Foster, chairman of the panel, said at a National Defense University Foundation presentation. "They will be many times their design life" before they are refurbished or replaced. "We have opened some of the warheads and found some defects that are worrisome," he added.

That trend creates extra burdens on the stockpile stewardship program. "As our nuclear weapons continue to age, we expect more parts to require replacement," Gordon said. Creating exact replacement parts is difficult, he noted, because some production facilities have closed, and manufacturing techniques have changed. Component changes, of which nine are currently being undertaken, can affect the performance of nuclear weapons. Gordon pointed out that extensive analysis is required to ensure the components are acceptable, since full-up weapons tests aren't allowed, given the current test moratorium.

But Gordon also said the overall financial situation is getting better and NNSA's \$5.3-billion Fiscal 2002 budget request represents a 4.6% increase over last year. However, Foster said, that amount "does not turn the [existing] situation around."

The budget submission includes funds to pay for maintenance, evaluation and certification of the stockpile; manufacturing a certifiable W88 Trident missile warhead with a new pit that would be ready in 2003; and maintaining existing infrastructure, Gordon testified. However, it does not address issues such as future weapons refurbishment requirements or certification and production plans for the W88.

But the ongoing nuclear review could substantially change the magnitude of some of the stockpile problems, especially if the size of the nuclear inventory is cut. President Bush, in a speech May 1 at the National Defense University, indicated the Administration would pursue unilateral strategic arms reductions.

One of the areas that would be affected is the supply of tritium, a critical substance in every U.S. nuclear warhead. The current supply will last until 2005 before the five-year reserve has to be drawn on, Gordon said. However, if nuclear weapons levels are reduced, the supply would last longer. If they aren't, one year of the reserve "may be consumed," Gordon noted.

Deliveries of new tritium gas, to be produced by the Tennessee Valley Authority, has been delayed because of congressional action in 1999 and won't start until February 2006. However, Gordon said that enough tritium would be produced to rebuild the reserve within 2-3 years.

Another major area of concern for both NNSA and the expert panel is the status of plutonium pit production for W88 warheads. Every year, one warhead of each type is destructively tested, leaving fewer weapons in the stockpile. In the case of the W88, the Energy Dept. is nearing the point where continued destructive testing would drop the number of weapons below the required level.

A limited pit production capability is now being established at Los Alamos National Laboratory, N.M., with eight development pits having been produced. A W88 pit that could be certified is supposed to be ready by 2003.

But there is some question about whether the new pits can be certified. Foster noted that the manufacturing process has changed and that the new pits are being cast, not rolled, and then machined. As a result, the structure is slightly different. While some testing of cast pits was done before the moratorium, indicating there won't be a performance change, Foster said there are those who aren't convinced. Two key issues surround the debate, he said: "One, nobody knows; two, nobody can prove [they're right]."

TO RUN THE PIT production effort, NNSA established a project office. The organization will also examine long-term production needs. Decisions on the future production facility, which Foster said could take 15 years to become operational, would be based on the findings of the nuclear posture review. Furthermore, results from a pit-aging study should become available in 2004, which would reveal how long the existing ones can last. "We are making progress in plutonium pit manufacturing and certification, although there are serious issues ahead of us," Gordon said.

Concerning other nuclear warheads, such as the W76, W80 and B61 bomb, the Nuclear Weapons Council last year finally resolved the amount of refurbishment work that should be undertaken. But existing budget levels don't support the schedule and scope of work planned for the W76 and W80, Gordon said, although the B61 is funded. That situation may change, though, pending the Pentagon review.

FOSTER ALSO SAID consideration should be given to designing alternative warheads. "There is not much margin in these weapons," he said, noting that in the competition to build smaller, lighter and higher yield warheads, designers at the Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos national laboratories devised "very sensitive" designs. But given the difficulty of sustaining weapons without nuclear tests, more robust designs may be needed, even if the warheads are less efficient. An added benefit, Foster said, is that the activity would train warhead designers and test personnel.

To assess the performance of nuclear weapons with a test moratorium in place, the Energy Dept. has been pushing for the development of computer models that can adequately simulate weapons performance. The debate over

whether simulations can replace testing has been among the most heated in conjunction with the moratorium. Foster noted that computer programs have produced good results, but "there are a number of underground tests we can't reproduce. We have these enigmas." Gordon's outlook is more positive, though. "Early versions of the three-dimensional weapon performance codes are resolving previously unexplained phenomena from past underground test data and are contributing to the resolution of issues that have been raised by our surveillance program." Even if a decision was made to test, Foster noted that it would take 2-3 years to get ready for such an event. That time span is too long and doesn't give the President any real options, he said, arguing it should be cut to 3-4 months. The NNSA director said his organization "will look hard again at improving test readiness, and will review whether an appropriate level of resources is being applied."

THE SIMULATION SIDE is experiencing its own budget woes. The Advanced Simulation and Computing effort is trying to deliver the massive computing power needed to model nuclear weapons performance in three dimensions. The goal has been to reach a 100-teraops (100-trillion operations-per-sec.) capability by 2004. But funding in the 2002 budget will cause a one-year delay, Gordon said.

Washington Post  
May 22, 2001  
Pg. 18

## **Missile Monitoring Ends**

MOSCOW -- Officials from the United States, Russia and three other former Soviet republics yesterday marked the end of 13 years of monitoring under a landmark U.S.-Soviet disarmament treaty that eliminated an entire class of nuclear missiles.

The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, or INF, treaty, which was signed by President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1987, envisaged dismantling almost 2,700 nuclear missiles on both sides under unprecedented scrutiny by inspectors.

After the Soviet Union's collapse, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine inherited some of the Soviet arsenal and fulfilled Soviet obligations under the treaty alongside Russia.

Under the treaty, about 20,000 U.S. and Russian inspectors carried out more than 1,000 inspections along with around-the-clock oversight of the U.S. plant in the Salt Lake City suburb of Magna, Utah, and Russia's plant in Votkinsk that manufactured missiles.

"Never before had we had such access to each other's weapons delivery systems and to the centers and facilities where these systems were based," said Steven Steiner, who represented the United States on the Special Verification Commission.

Although the INF treaty has unlimited duration, its extensive INF monitoring regime is to end May 31. U.S. and Russian officials carried out last checks of respective facilities this month.

--Associated Press

Navy News & Undersea Technology  
May 21, 2001  
Pg. 1

## **NATO Navies Are Preparing For Integrated TBMD**

By Lisa Troshinsky

Navies of NATO countries have been discussing how they would conduct integrated Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) for the past two and a half years. This little known fact will soon receive a higher profile, now that the Bush Administration has zeroed in on ballistic missile defense as his first DOD line of business, said a defense think-tank analyst.

"The fact that the allied navies have been talking isn't new. What is new is the political atmosphere," the analyst told Navy News. "There has been a commitment on the military level; now we have the political atmosphere that will

give these efforts a boost. Bush is emphasizing that he has allies in mind regarding missile defense. Now the navies have a chance to say, "We've developed forums, we're in step with the administration."

In fact, later this year, the NATO Naval Armament Group (Subgroup 11) will conduct a feasibility study on whether the organization should require a program for integrated TBMD.

But short of reaching prime time news or NATO doctrine, the groundwork for integrated TBMD has started, unofficially, with allied navies, the source said.

"Navies talk to each other quite a bit. They're out to sea, running into each other, exercising together," the analyst said. "They discuss TBMD through NATO forums .... this doesn't receive a lot of press. But they've gone a long way in creating good allied relations among navies on this issue, and it will get a higher profile."

"Navies [of the United States and its allies] have been talking about the role of some defenses as they relate to the protection from short- and medium-range missiles. Allied navies are interested in protecting the expeditionary forces of coalition forces. They have been talking in multi-lateral groups inside and outside NATO," he said.

One of these outside-of-NATO arenas—the Maritime Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (MTBMD) Forum—was reported on last week by Jane's Defence Weekly. The group was started in 1999 by U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Rodney Rempt's office (Rempt is Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Missile Defense and Director, Surface Warfare). The MTBMD is a way to engage allies on TBMD on the following levels: technical, concepts of operations, strategy, platforms, and systems. The May 16 article stated that the group started with the U.S. Navy, the Royal Netherlands navy, and the German navy; and has since added as observers the Italian navy, the Royal Australian navy, Canada's Maritime Command, and the Spanish navy.

### **New European Platforms Could Conduct TBMD**

Many European naval ships will have significant leaps in capabilities. The ability to go from shooting down an aircraft to potentially knocking out a missile is a big jump, the source said. In order to do this, they will have to be able to track better, have better command and control, better radar and a Vertical Launch System (VLS). A lot of older European ships don't have VLS, but rely on traditional anti-aircraft fire or missiles not VLS-capable. Within the next five to six years, foreign navies from the Netherlands, Germany, Britain, Italy, France, Spain, and Norway will be adopting new ship platforms (new classes of frigates and destroyers) with capabilities to allow them to take part in ballistic missile missions. Or take part in other missions that will free up U.S. assets to take part in ballistic missile defense, the analyst said.

"Those countries' new ship platforms will likely have radars similar to [U.S.] radars, and they are talking about putting on anti-air missiles, and the launch systems that will accept missiles that could serve a purpose for TBMD," he said. "These systems of radars, VLS and the right command and control systems could be upgraded for TBMD as other systems come on line."

Similarly, the U.S. Navy is leaving itself the option of upgrading the future DD-21 destroyer for TBMD in the future, if so needed.

Some specific European examples of preparation for ballistic missile defense are: The design discussions for the future British Type 45 (anti-air warfare) frigate have included a role for TBMD. This frigate will have Samson radar (similar to the U.S. SPY-1), and a VLS that will accept PAAMS (Principle Anti-Air Missile System), the British version of the U.S. Standard Missile.

Spain and Norway are buying the U.S. Aegis command and control system that will give ships over-the-horizon target tracking and shooting capability. And the Netherlands and Germany are developing new frigates that will have active phased-array radars (APAR) and Link 16 capability.

The amount of time spent debating U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) means a lot of opportunity has been lost to lay the ground work for TBMD, the analyst said.

"Throughout most of the 1990s, the U.S. military didn't talk to Europeans on the political level—above the uniformed services—about theater ballistic missile defense," he said. "We're now just starting to do that."

"There is a tremendous split in Europe on the issues of NMD and TBMD," he continued. "Whereas the Germans are concerned of the destabilizing impact NMD could have on their relations with Russia next door, they also are concerned that a country in the Middle East could reach them with a theater ballistic missile."

Though they haven't done anything specific in terms of programs, European allies recognize there is a common threat, and Europe is interested in protecting its coalition forces from TBMD threats, he said.



## Republicans Downplay Cost Estimates On NMD

By Frank Wolfe

The Republican Policy Committee last week issued a paper that rebuffed Democrats' criticism of deployment of a National Missile Defense (NMD) and downplayed estimates by some Democrats that put the cost of a comprehensive NMD at \$100 billion.

"Even if a missile defense system cost \$100 billion to design, deploy, maintain and operate over 15 years, this represents only about two cents out of every dollar spent on national defense," according to the paper, adding that the two cents assumes a stable \$310 billion defense budget over 15 years.

The committee's paper noted that President Bush wants to leverage "all of the research efforts of the past decade" to deploy an NMD system, an effort that would lower NMD costs.

The Republican Policy Committee's paper advocated United States' withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the former Soviet Union and said that the Democrats who oppose NMD deployment are stuck in a Cold War mentality that endangers the United States.

"Mutual vulnerability, long considered the basis for deterrence, is no longer relevant to current threats. The Bush administration is beginning a dialogue with allies, and Russia and China, on how to move to new strategic relationships," the paper said. "The purpose of a treaty is to enhance U.S. national security. The ABM Treaty fails on this count. And when arms control treaties no longer serve as a tool for U.S. security, the United States should remove itself as a party to that treaty."

Article XV of the treaty permits each party to withdraw from the treaty "if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests."

"Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the ABM Treaty encourages a hostile relationship--forgoing defenses in favor of leaving our populations vulnerable to strategic nuclear attack--hardly a suitable foundation for building more positive relations between the United States and Russia," according to the committee's paper.

Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said this month that he believed it would be possible to work with the Russians to modify the ABM Treaty to include deployment of a land-based NMD system that would not go much beyond the 200 interceptors at two sites allowed under the treaty (Defense Daily, May 14). Levin also said that a new security framework could include limited defenses and "possibly" joint work with the Russians on a boost-phase intercept system.

Unilateral withdrawal by the United States from the treaty, however, would likely make the United States less secure because such abrogation would encourage China and Russia not to scale back their nuclear stockpiles, but to build them, and could lead Russia to continue development of penetration aids and countermeasures, Levin said.

But the Republican Policy Committee's paper said that China "was building and modernizing its strategic offensive nuclear forces even when the Clinton administration showed no interest in building a missile defense system" and that Russia, already secure because of its thousands of warheads, cannot add to its nuclear forces due to the dire economic conditions there.

"Today, most countries' missile programs have nothing to do with U.S. efforts on ballistic missile defense," according to the paper. "They are driven by regional and domestic considerations. Often, in the case of proliferators, weapons of mass destruction are being pursued as a tool for blackmail and for the prestige derived from membership in the 'nuclear club.'"